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not theory simply because no test
tubes are involved: most
computational biology, including
most of the things my group does,
is really computational
experiment. Genuine theory,
where theoretical models are built
and pitted against observations, is
on the rise too, but I do not think it
will ever be as important in
biology as it is in physics. This is
because many crucial aspects of
biological systems, the products
of interplay between mutation and
selection, may lend themselves to
description and generalizations,
but not to derivation from a small
set of simple principles. 
Is science a social construct or
a quest for objective
knowledge? To a very large
extent, it is a social construct in
the sense that what is recognized
as important research and funded
is determined by criteria that can
hardly be considered scientific.
The role of scientific establishment
and fashion in the development of
science is huge as is the influence
of social factors outside science.
Another crucial matter is the
language we use to make
scientific statements. I think it is
useful to deconstruct this
language in order to try and see
which statements are about the
Universe and which are just about
language. All that being said, the
current advances in objective
knowledge are quite amazing.
Are philosophy and the history
of science important for
scientists? To me at least, they
definitely are. The works of
several 20th century philosophers
help me to understand better what
I am doing. History of science also
is of great value. It is almost like
the tree of life: the big branches
are relatively stable, but most of
the twigs have dried and died,
often because they were indeed
fruitless, but sometimes simply
because growth in other parts of
the tree overshadowed them. It is
sometimes instructive to look
back at forgotten research
directions and disputes of old. 
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Theory in Biology
Happy days here
again?
Graeme Mitchison
The late 1960s were happy days
for a biological theoretician. The
monumental early discoveries of
molecular biology were still fresh
in people’s minds, and it was
hoped that the further ramparts of
biology — development and
neuroscience — would yield to the
speculative, model-building
approach that had just proved so
brilliantly successful.
I possess a relic of those times:
the proceedings of a series of
meetings at the Rockefeller’s Villa
Serbelloni entitled ‘Towards a
Theoretical Biology’. On the
inside covers of the volumes are
photographs of eminent scientists
marshalled around a grand
mahogany table. The likeness to
the table at the Solvay
Conference of 1911, attended by
many of the greatest physicists of
the time, is surely not accidental;
the arrangement and poses of the
figures is strikingly similar. No
doubt the Serbelloni organizers
reasoned that biology was in a
state of ferment comparable to
that which gripped physics fifty
years earlier, and that the
distinguished scientists they had
assembled would lay down the
theoretical foundations of their
subject, just as the physicists had
done fifty years earlier.
The meeting must have been
lively and enjoyable, but it did not
usher in a new epoch, and
theoretical biology continued
much as it always had done, as an
essentially opportunistic activity
with a ragbag of methods. As the
examples in Geoffrey North’s
recent editorial (Curr. Biol. 13,
R719–R720) show, its successes
arise from a close alliance
between theory and experiment,
so close that the two are often
carried out by the same person.
This is clearly a long way from the
physicists’ paradigm, where
theory has a life of its own and
can be pursued in isolation, often
in separate departments devoted
to high abstraction.
Or at least that is how it
appeared until quite recently. But
the genomic era has brought with
it a rapid gearing-up towards
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The participants of the first conference in the series ‘Towards a Theoretical Biology’,
held at the Villa Serbelloni in August 1966. Seated, from left to right: Christopher
Longuet-Higgins, Ernst Mayr, ‘Wad’ Waddington, Ruth Sager, Brian Goodwin, Doris
Manning and John Maynard Smith. Standing: A. G. Cairns-Smith, Rene’ Thom, Sam
Devons, John Platt, Howard Pattee, Christopher Zeeman, Dick Lewontin, Karl
Kornacker, Paul Lieber, Jack Cowan, Heinrich Kroeger, Lewis Wolpert and Donald
Michie. Photograph reproduced with permission from Towards a Theoretical Biology,
Edited by C.H. Waddington, Edinburgh University Press (1968).
high-throughput science, and
there are now whole buildings full
of theoreticians armed with
massive computing power. Has
theoretical biology arrived at last?
Within some of these buildings
it seems that time has taken a
giant step backwards. The figures
bent over their computer consoles
are engaged in much the same
quest as the frock-coated
microscopists and Dodo-stuffers
of bygone years; they are today’s
taxonomists, though their raw
materials are of course sequences
rather than morphological
features, and statistical models
and ingenious computer
algorithms have replaced
fixatives, stains and intuitive
systematics.
Taxonomy is a noble subject,
but it is the bedrock from which
conceptual leaps can be made
and not in itself what the
Serbelloni participants would
have called theory. Perhaps they
would have felt their goals were
closer to those of that other
constellation of theoreticians,
whose housing arrangements are
also undergoing an expansion:
the systems biologists. These
brave spirits seek, amongst other
things, to bring numerical
prediction and dynamic
modelling to cellular machinery.
If they succeed, we should be
able to interrogate a computer
program and discover how a
living system will respond to any
conditions we give it. The system
in question might be a special
pathway; in moments of hubris, it
could be a whole Escherichia coli
cell.
I have sampled my colleagues’
opinions and found a solid
consensus of opposition to
systems biology. Mathematical
models of complex biochemical
systems have never worked, they
say. Far better to go for logical,
diagrammatic, piece-by-piece
descriptions; then we will have the
large picture. The more eminent
the colleague, the more
confidently he or she asserts this
opinion.
So many wise heads must
surely be wrong. Unfortunately,
the arguments on their side are
rather good. Take the
transcription factor network of
E. coli. There are about 300 of
these factors and an
extrapolation from the hundred or
so currently studied suggests the
network will be very richly
interconnected, with much
feedback and multiple control of
genes. This, however, is the least
of the problem, for the operation
of these factors can also be
stochastic (there may be only a
few copies of any factor in the
cell), can depend on the
formation of elaborate
complexes, and can have a
baroque mode of control of
transcription, involving twisting or
looping out of DNA, for instance.
So what seems at first sight like a
mere matter of several hundred
rate equations turns into
labyrinthine nightmare. That’s
biology for you.
Pessimistic as this picture is, it
is not as bad as the alternative.
Listen to a biologist explaining a
complex system, with diagrams
of acronymic molecular
components, descriptive
schemes with boxes and arrows,
and with some detailed structural
information thrown in, and after a
while a blur builds up in the
mind. It is like a lecture on the
history of the Balkans. Neat
parcellations break down,
aggregates spring up
everywhere, you never know who
is related to whom, and all the
names are unpronounceable.
In my view, biology needs
numbers; not after the fashion of
physics, but in a good
engineering, computational spirit.
The Hodgkin–Huxley equations
and Denis Noble’s model of the
heart are fine examples of this,
though it could be objected that
they represent the most tractable
aspect of biological modelling,
with well-behaved components
(ions get up to fewer tricks than
proteins) and strong guiding
principles from electrochemistry.
This just means that we shall
have to find guiding principles for
other kinds of cellular machinery,
and acquire the skills to navigate
through the labyrinth. Human
ingenuity will find a way.
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Quick guide
The domestic dog
genome
Elaine A. Ostrander and Kenine E.
Comstock
Why are dogs of interest to
biologists? Over 400 breeds of
dog exist worldwide today, each a
closed breeding population with a
unique pattern of size,
morphology and behavior. But the
aggressive breeding programs
used to create purebred dogs
have burdened them with over
350 inherited disorders, many
associated with just one or a few
breeds. Breeds expanded rapidly
from popular sires to meet
breeders’ demands suffer the
most. It has been suggested that
the unique structure of the
purebred dog population may
greatly simplify the mapping of
genes associated with complex
traits that have proven intractable
by studying human families.
The canine genome map. The
most recently published canine
map, a joint venture between
investigators at the University of
Rennes and the Fred Hutchinson
Cancer Research Center (FHCRC)
has an average of one marker
every 900 kb across the dog’s 38
autosomes and X and Y
chromosomes. A minimal mapping
set of 325 well distributed, highly
polymorphic microsatellite markers
is available for genome-wide scans
of 8–10 cM density. Efforts are also
underway, in collaboration with
investigators at The Institute for
Genomic Research (TIGR), to order
10,000 independent genes derived
from the 1.5X sequence on the
canine chromosomal map. This will
provide a high density resource for
comparative mapping between the
human and dog genome. The
canine expressed sequence tag
(EST) project, an additional
resource, is providing a foundation
for much needed canine
expression arrays. The effort has
been led by investigators at Cold
Spring Harbor Laboratory who
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